china-taiwan and limits of state action

[dmolnar]

On Sat, 23 Dec 2000, Alex Shirado wrote:

> 
> David,
> 
> You have a simple view of China-Taiwan relations, but you are more of a
> computer specialist than an Asia one, so your deficiency is quite
> forgivable.

I suspected as much. The problem with this is that I saw the "individual
action indistinguishable from state action" quickly and have been having a
hard time thinking past it. I'm sure that the picture is much more
nuanced than what I have...

 There are actually other "cyber-war" examples which come to mind where it
wasn't clear whether an "attack" was the result of a state action or just
some crackers. One such was when NATO's web site was defaced; there was a
quote to the effect of "Now the war is fought on all fronts" which made
the rounds.

The quote is interesting first because it places defacing a web site on
the same level as firing bullets at people. Next because I'm not sure if
it was clear who exactly defaced the site. 

Recently I've heard that Israel and neighboring Arab countries are going
back and forth. For instance
http://www.all.net/intel/mid-east/10-26-2000-art1.html
http://www.meib.org/articles/0011_me2.htm


> 
> I recently heard a story about policeman in Taiwan who is close to
> retiring. When he was asked what he planned to do when he retires, he
> said that he wanted to go back to the Mainland. 
> 
> To the outsider, this would seem strange, but it would be hard to believe 
> that Taiwan and China do not have a workable and effective MO.

I suppose the closest the U.S. has had to this was the Cold War. We did
have some kind of MO with the USSR, but we didn't (don't) share the same 
kind of common heritage that China and Taiwan do. 

> 
> Someone who responded to your post stated that it is far more likely that
> China would be the aggressor in a cross-strait spat. Now, where the
> Taiwan-China working MO might break down would be when individuals
> act. In a way, hacking is the attack of the powerless: it allows geeks
> like us to launch an assault when we cannot afford tactical weapons. So it
> is wrong to think that angry Taiwanese would hesitate from waving the red
> in front of the bull.

Yes - what seems interesting is that cracking makes offense as
"democratic" as defense. That is, anyone with a weapon can defend their
home and territory. That's what a militia is supposed to be, after all. 
(of course, given the massive inequality in weapons available to armies
and available to private citizens, the militia may not last long...)

But the local militia usually can't unilaterally launch an attack on some
foreign country. (Well, maybe those on the border; the film "Canadian
Bacon" comes to mind). 

A minor nitpick - it seems strange to say that we are "powerless" and
then note how we can launch an assault. Maybe it would be better to say
that this gives us a different kind of power or "redefines power."


> As you state, there is no cyberterror treaty governing how information
> regarding attacks is treated. Many of us take for granted that other
> informal arrangements govern how this information is treated. 

If we think about it at all. Perhaps you're living in a country where
more people remember other countries exist. :-)

In any case, I find it interesting to see the resistance to the current
proposed cyber-crime treaty
http://www.gilc.org/privacy/coe-letter-1000.html
which rests on notions of human rights and so on. Values I agree with. 
At the same time, this seems to place the signing organizations "against"
the Israelis, Chinese, or others who may find that current informal
arrangements aren't enough. 


> 
> The questions you ask are valid. Indeed, they are some of the reasons why
> this listserve exists. You are asking core questions as to how we
> should treat state activity and personal responsibility. When you find the
> answers, let me know ; )

That's why I'm posting here, after all.

Thanks, 
-David