The Unbreakable Cipher (2)
coderman
coderman at gmail.com
Thu Sep 26 03:32:18 PDT 2013
On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 2:34 AM, brian carroll
<electromagnetize at gmail.com> wrote:
> coderman wrote:
>
>> you're wrong.
>
> perfect. thank you
brian: you're a verbose individual. but you respond usefully *grin*
> i think i grasp a fundamental concept of crypto
> that relates size of message (message length)
> with design of algorithmic structure needed to
> successfully embed or hide the message else
> hidden order may be easily visible/discovered
it is interesting how these fundamentals change across public key
systems, and the ideal one time pad.
symmetric ciphers are a particular beast... (and combined
authentication and encryption modes even more particular ;)
> i still contend this is different for set theory and
> models of noise ...
>
> in that 'keys' could function differently in bit set
> approach though perhaps rekeying is universal
> as a security principle yet potentially flawed if
> it could reveal a particular structure leading
> to its compromise...
in a poor implementation or protocol, re-keying can provide an
opportunity for cipher suite downgrade or other privacy destroying
attacks.
effective frequent re-keying requires the other INFOSEC/OPSEC
dependencies be met!
> whereas reusing an 'infinity
> key' (regenerating keys or using same key in
> new instantiations, accessing different arbitrary
> structure as keychain multitool) may function
> in a different context than existing approaches,
note that for all intents and purposes, you should use a fresh,
absolutely random key for each re-keying. key "stretching" or
derivation methods suffer the same types of vulnerabilities over large
enough output that the original cipher does.
instead of spending your time trying to securely "stretch" a few keys,
just generate a large number of perfectly random keys instead!
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