[liberationtech] What I've learned from Cryptocat
frank at journalistsecurity.net
frank at journalistsecurity.net
Mon Aug 6 22:19:44 PDT 2012
Hey guys,
I appreciate the importance and depth of this discussion. But I also
wish to underscore that most of the people who are at risk are not
using any tools whether they be CrytoCat, PGP, GChat or others for the
simple reason that they either cannot figure them out, or don't have
time to figure them out, or both. And I am talking about people at risk
in many different nations.
No doubt the functional security of tools is an indispensable,
essential concern. Ignoring any vulnerabilities is dangerous, indeed.
But the usability of the same tools and making them accessible to
non-technologists is just as big a concern, in my view. I know you guys
think that many such users including Western journalists are simply
lazy. But many, if not most of the available tools are simply not
intuitive, or not as much as most technologists who already know how to
use them seem to think.
How many people on this list have spent time asking non-technologists
and other users who have tried, but have since given up even trying to
use tools like PGP? Or have examined how new users interact with such
tools? I have a great deal of respect for this community. But to be
honest it seems to me that neither the technologists nor the donors
have spent much time asking such questions.
If a novice user make a mistake in PGP, for example, it's over. Options
are not intuitive if you don't already know them. And if you hit the
wrong button, you can end up at a deadend with no guidance how to get
back on track. Trust me. I know. And I am not trashing PGP. I know well
and fully appreciate it's value and I have used it and continue to use
it hostile environments. And I also know that users and only users can
make crucial choices during use for their own security. I get that,
too. But most digital security tools still do not do a good job of
laying out, let alone explaining the options. And I say that with
respect for the value of the tools and options themselves.
Cryptocat is one of the most user-friendly tools out there, and I think
Nadim deserves credit for the effort. Of course, the vulnerabilities
must be fixed before anyone should use it in a hostile environment.
Although the level of vulnerability might also depend on the nature of
the threat in any particular environment. But I also think we need to
spend as much time making tools accessible as we do making them secure
if we are going to reach the people who really need them. And right now
few if any of these tools are having the reach that we all agree is
needed. And that is an issue largely of usability.
I think with more constructive collaboration we would achieve both. We
need to. Thanks.
Best, Frank
Frank Smyth
Executive Director
Global Journalist Security
[1]frank at journalistsecurity.net
Tel. + 1 202 244 0717
Cell + 1 202 352 1736
Twitter: @JournoSecurity
Website: [2]www.journalistsecurity.net
[3]PGP Public Key
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-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: [liberationtech] What I've learned from Cryptocat
From: Moxie Marlinspike <[4]moxie at thoughtcrime.org>
Date: Mon, August 06, 2012 10:29 pm
To: [5]liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu
On 08/06/2012 06:59 PM, Eleanor Saitta wrote:
> Except that with your harm mitigation, you push many potential users
> back to plaintext, where they are guaranteed to be owned. What
> percentage of potential cryptocat users would the plugin version have
to
> stop from using the tool for you to accept that there was a place for
> the non-plugin version?
Let's stop using the word "plaintext," because my understanding is that
none of the chat services we're speaking of transmit data in the clear.
As I see it, there are currently three possible vectors for attack with
"existing" web-based chat services:
1) SSL interception.
2) Server compromise.
3) Server operator.
The technology in CryptoCat v1 does not address any of these three
vectors, and all of them remain possible. My position is that it's
actually more susceptible to attack via #1 and #2 than existing
web-based chat solutions. I believe your position is that it improves
on vector #3 by virtue of being not-Facebook. (I'm curious how you
measure #3 in comparison to GChat.)
If we postulate that CryptoCat does improve vector #3 by virtue of
being
not-Facebook, it isn't a result of the technology, but simply that
we've
agreed Nadim has a better monitoring/interception track record than
Facebook. If that's something you think is valuable, it actually seems
like it'd potentially be better served by having someone like the EFF
or
Riseup host a web-based and SSL-protected chat service, without brining
any additional cryptography confusion into the mix. A trust project,
not a cryptography project.
Unfortunately for me, I'd rather depend on cryptography than people.
But I believe that CryptoCat is actually well positioned to drive
changes in the ecosystem that will allow them to really improve on
those
three vectors in time. I think it's difficult to experiment in public
with security tools, however, and that it's a sage decision to make a
secure solution available (CryptoCat v2) and work on reducing friction
while maintaining security from there.
- moxie
--
[6]http://www.thoughtcrime.org
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References
1. mailto:frank at journalistsecurity.net
2. http://www.journalistsecurity.net/
3. http://www.journalistsecurity.net/franks-pgp-public-key
4. mailto:moxie at thoughtcrime.org
5. mailto:liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu
6. http://www.thoughtcrime.org/
7. mailto:liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu
8. https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
9. https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
10. http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech
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