[declan at well.com: [Politech] Transcript of briefing on NSA surveillance by A
Tyler Durden
camera_lumina at hotmail.com
Wed Dec 21 07:22:52 PST 2005
>Another very important point to remember is that we have to have a
>reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the communication is a
>member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a member of an
>organization affiliated with al Qaeda, or working in support of al
>Qaeda.
Whew. That's a relief. All those anti-war commies had it coming. And those
damned cryptography nuts. Oh, pro-labor too.
As long as I shuttle back and forth between my home and the mall and don't
turn on my computer I should be fine.
-TD
>From: Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org>
>To: transhumantech at yahoogroups.com, cypherpunks at jfet.org
>Subject: [declan at well.com: [Politech] Transcript of briefing on NSA
>surveillance by Alberto Gonzales and Michael Hayden [priv]]
>Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 08:53:33 +0100
>
>----- Forwarded message from Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com> -----
>
>From: Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com>
>Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 23:15:46 -0500
>To: politech at politechbot.com
>Subject: [Politech] Transcript of briefing on NSA surveillance by Alberto
> Gonzales and Michael Hayden [priv]
>User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 1.0.6 (Macintosh/20050716)
>
>
>
>
>THE WHITE HOUSE
>
>
>
>Office of the Press Secretary
>
>For Immediate Release December 19, 2005
>
>
>
>
>
>PRESS BRIEFING
>
>BY
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL ALBERTO GONZALES
>
>AND
>
>GENERAL MICHAEL HAYDEN,
>
>PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
>
>
>
>James S. Brady Briefing Room
>
>
>
>
>
>8:30 A.M. EST
>
>
>
>
>
>MR. McCLELLAN: Good morning, everybody. I've got with me the Attorney
>General and General Hayden here this morning to brief you on the legal
>issues surrounding the NSA authorization and take whatever questions you
>have for them on that. The Attorney General will open with some
>comments and then they'll be glad to take your questions.
>
>
>
>And with that, I'll turn it over to General Gonzales.
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: Thanks, Scott.
>
>
>
>The President confirmed the existence of a highly classified program on
>Saturday. The program remains highly classified; there are many
>operational aspects of the program that have still not been disclosed
>and we want to protect that because those aspects of the program are
>very, very important to protect the national security of this country.
>So I'm only going to be talking about the legal underpinnings for what
>has been disclosed by the President.
>
>
>
>The President has authorized a program to engage in electronic
>surveillance of a particular kind, and this would be the intercepts of
>contents of communications where one of the -- one party to the
>communication is outside the United States. And this is a very
>important point -- people are running around saying that the United
>States is somehow spying on American citizens calling their neighbors.
>Very, very important to understand that one party to the communication
>has to be outside the United States.
>
>
>
>Another very important point to remember is that we have to have a
>reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the communication is a
>member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a member of an
>organization affiliated with al Qaeda, or working in support of al
>Qaeda. We view these authorities as authorities to confront the enemy
>in which the United States is at war with -- and that is al Qaeda and
>those who are supporting or affiliated with al Qaeda.
>
>
>
>What we're trying to do is learn of communications, back and forth, from
>within the United States to overseas with members of al Qaeda. And
>that's what this program is about.
>
>
>
>Now, in terms of legal authorities, the Foreign Intelligence
>Surveillance Act provides -- requires a court order before engaging in
>this kind of surveillance that I've just discussed and the President
>announced on Saturday, unless there is somehow -- there is -- unless
>otherwise authorized by statute or by Congress. That's what the law
>requires. Our position is, is that the authorization to use force,
>which was passed by the Congress in the days following September 11th,
>constitutes that other authorization, that other statute by Congress, to
>engage in this kind of signals intelligence.
>
>
>
>Now, that -- one might argue, now, wait a minute, there's nothing in the
>authorization to use force that specifically mentions electronic
>surveillance. Let me take you back to a case that the Supreme Court
>reviewed this past -- in 2004, the Hamdi decision. As you remember, in
>that case, Mr. Hamdi was a U.S. citizen who was contesting his detention
>by the United States government. What he said was that there is a
>statute, he said, that specifically prohibits the detention of American
>citizens without permission, an act by Congress -- and he's right, 18
>USC 4001a requires that the United States government cannot detain an
>American citizen except by an act of Congress.
>
>
>
>We took the position -- the United States government took the position
>that Congress had authorized that detention in the authorization to use
>force, even though the authorization to use force never mentions the
>word "detention." And the Supreme Court, a plurality written by Justice
>O'Connor agreed. She said, it was clear and unmistakable that the
>Congress had authorized the detention of an American citizen captured on
>the battlefield as an enemy combatant for the remainder -- the duration
>of the hostilities. So even though the authorization to use force did
>not mention the word, "detention," she felt that detention of enemy
>soldiers captured on the battlefield was a fundamental incident of
>waging war, and therefore, had been authorized by Congress when they
>used the words, "authorize the President to use all necessary and
>appropriate force."
>
>For the same reason, we believe signals intelligence is even more a
>fundamental incident of war, and we believe has been authorized by the
>Congress. And even though signals intelligence is not mentioned in the
>authorization to use force, we believe that the Court would apply the
>same reasoning to recognize the authorization by Congress to engage in
>this kind of electronic surveillance.
>
>
>
>I might also add that we also believe the President has the inherent
>authority under the Constitution, as Commander-in-Chief, to engage in
>this kind of activity. Signals intelligence has been a fundamental
>aspect of waging war since the Civil War, where we intercepted
>telegraphs, obviously, during the world wars, as we intercepted
>telegrams in and out of the United States. Signals intelligence is very
>important for the United States government to know what the enemy is
>doing, to know what the enemy is about to do. It is a fundamental
>incident of war, as Justice O'Connor talked about in the Hamdi decision.
>We believe that -- and those two authorities exist to allow, permit the
>United States government to engage in this kind of surveillance.
>
>
>
>The President, of course, is very concerned about the protection of
>civil liberties, and that's why we've got strict parameters, strict
>guidelines in place out at NSA to ensure that the program is operating
>in a way that is consistent with the President's directives. And,
>again, the authorization by the President is only to engage in
>surveillance of communications where one party is outside the United
>States, and where we have a reasonable basis to conclude that one of the
>parties of the communication is either a member of al Qaeda or
>affiliated with al Qaeda.
>
>
>
>Mike, do you want to -- have anything to add?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN: I'd just add, in terms of what we do globally with
>regard to signals intelligence, which is a critical part of defending
>the nation, there are probably no communications more important to what
>it is we're trying to do to defend the nation; no communication is more
>important for that purpose than those communications that involve al
>Qaeda, and one end of which is inside the homeland, one end of which is
>inside the United States. Our purpose here is to detect and prevent
>attacks. And the program in this regard has been successful.
>
>
>
>Q General, are you able to say how many Americans were caught in this
>surveillance?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: I'm not -- I can't get into the specific
>numbers because that information remains classified. Again, this is not
>a situation where -- of domestic spying. To the extent that there is a
>moderate and heavy communication involving an American citizen, it would
>be a communication where the other end of the call is outside the United
>States and where we believe that either the American citizen or the
>person outside the United States is somehow affiliated with al Qaeda.
>
>
>
>Q General, can you tell us why you don't choose to go to the FISA
>court?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: Well, we continue to go to the FISA court
>and obtain orders. It is a very important tool that we continue to
>utilize. Our position is that we are not legally required to do, in
>this particular case, because the law requires that we -- FISA requires
>that we get a court order, unless authorized by a statute, and we
>believe that authorization has occurred.
>
>
>
>The operators out at NSA tell me that we don't have the speed and the
>agility that we need, in all circumstances, to deal with this new kind
>of enemy. You have to remember that FISA was passed by the Congress in
>1978. There have been tremendous advances in technology --
>
>
>
>Q But it's been kind of retroactively, hasn't it?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: -- since then. Pardon me?
>
>
>
>Q It's been done retroactively before, hasn't it?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: What do you mean, "retroactively"?
>
>
>
>Q You just go ahead and then you apply for the FISA clearance,
>because it's damn near automatic.
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: If we -- but there are standards that have
>to be met, obviously, and you're right, there is a procedure where we --
>an emergency procedure that allows us to make a decision to authorize --
>to utilize FISA, and then we go to the court and get confirmation of
>that authority.
>
>
>
>But, again, FISA is very important in the war on terror, but it doesn't
>provide the speed and the agility that we need in all circumstances to
>deal with this new kind of threat.
>
>
>
>Q But what -- go ahead.
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN: Let me just add to the response to the last question.
>As the Attorney General says, FISA is very important, we make full use
>of FISA. But if you picture what FISA was designed to do, FISA is
>designed to handle the needs in the nation in two broad categories:
>there's a law enforcement aspect of it; and the other aspect is the
>continued collection of foreign intelligence. I don't think anyone
>could claim that FISA was envisaged as a tool to cover armed enemy
>combatants in preparation for attacks inside the United States. And
>that's what this authorization under the President is designed to help
>us do.
>
>
>
>Q Have you identified armed enemy combatants, through this program,
>in the United States?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN: This program has been successful in detecting and
>preventing attacks inside the United States.
>
>
>
>Q General Hayden, I know you're not going to talk about specifics
>about that, and you say it's been successful. But would it have been as
>successful -- can you unequivocally say that something has been stopped
>or there was an imminent attack or you got information through this that
>you could not have gotten through going to the court?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN: I can say unequivocally, all right, that we have got
>information through this program that would not otherwise have been
>available.
>
>
>
>Q Through the court? Because of the speed that you got it?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN: Yes, because of the speed, because of the procedures,
>because of the processes and requirements set up in the FISA process, I
>can say unequivocally that we have used this program in lieu of that and
>this program has been successful.
>
>
>
>Q But one of the things that concerns people is the slippery slope.
>If you said you absolutely need this program, you have to do it quickly
>-- then if you have someone you suspect being a member of al Qaeda, and
>they're in the United States, and there is a phone call between two
>people in the United States, why not use that, then, if it's so
>important? Why not go that route? Why not go further?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN: Across the board, there is a judgment that we all have
>to make -- and I made this speech a day or two after 9/11 to the NSA
>workforce -- I said, free peoples always have to judge where they want
>to be on that spectrum between security and liberty; that there will be
>great pressures on us after those attacks to move our national banner
>down in the direction of security. What I said to the NSA workforce is,
>our job is to keep Americans free by making Americans feel safe again.
>That's been the mission of the National Security Agency since the day
>after the attack, is when I talked -- two days after the attack is when
>I said that to the workforce.
>
>
>
>There's always a balancing between security and liberty. We understand
>that this is a more -- I'll use the word "aggressive" program than would
>be traditionally available under FISA. It is also less intrusive. It
>deals only with international calls. It is generally for far shorter
>periods of time. And it is not designed to collect reams of
>intelligence, but to detect and warn and prevent about attacks. And,
>therefore, that's where we've decided to draw that balance between
>security and liberty.
>
>
>
>Q Gentlemen, can you say when Congress was first briefed, who was
>included in that, and will there be a leaks investigation?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: Well of course, we're not going to -- we
>don't talk about -- we try not to talk about investigations. As to
>whether or not there will be a leak investigation, as the President
>indicated, this is really hurting national security, this has really
>hurt our country, and we are concerned that a very valuable tool has
>been compromised. As to whether or not there will be a leak
>investigation, we'll just have to wait and see.
>
>
>
>And your first question was?
>
>
>
>Q When was Congress first briefed --
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: I'm not going to -- I'm not going to talk
>about -- I'll let others talk about when Congress was first briefed.
>What I can say is, as the President indicated on Saturday, there have
>been numerous briefings with certain key members of Congress.
>Obviously, some members have come out since the revelations on Saturday,
>saying that they hadn't been briefed. This is a very classified
>program. It is probably the most classified program that exists in the
>United States government, because the tools are so valuable, and
>therefore, decisions were made to brief only key members of Congress.
>We have begun the process now of reaching out to other members of
>Congress. I met last night, for example, with Chairman Specter and
>other members of Congress to talk about the legal aspects of this
>program.
>
>
>
>And so we are engaged in a dialogue now to talk with Congress, but also
>-- but we're still mindful of the fact that still -- this is still a
>very highly classified program, and there are still limits about what we
>can say today, even to certain members of Congress.
>
>
>
>Q General, what's really compromised by the public knowledge of this
>program? Don't you assume that the other side thinks we're listening to
>them? I mean, come on.
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN: The fact that this program has been successful is proof
>to me that what you claim to be an assumption is certainly not
>universal. The more we discuss it, the more we put it in the face of
>those who would do us harm, the more they will respond to this and
>protect their communications and make it more difficult for us to defend
>the nation.
>
>
>
>Q Mr. Attorney General --
>
>
>
>Q -- became public, have you seen any evidence in a change in the
>tactics or --
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: We're not going to comment on that kind of
>operational aspect.
>
>
>
>Q You say this has really hurt the American people. Is that based
>only on your feeling about it, or is there some empirical evidence to
>back that up, even if you can't --
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: I think the existence of this program, the
>confirmation of the -- I mean, the fact that this program exists, in my
>judgment, has compromised national security, as the President indicated
>on Saturday.
>
>
>
>Q I'd like to ask you, what are the constitutional limits on this
>power that you see laid out in the statute and in your inherent
>constitutional war power? And what's to prevent you from just listening
>to everyone's conversation and trying to find the word "bomb," or
>something like that?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: Well, that's a good question. This was a
>question that was raised in some of my discussions last night with
>members of Congress. The President has not authorized -- has not
>authorized blanket surveillance of communications here in the United
>States. He's been very clear about the kind of surveillance that we're
>going to engage in. And that surveillance is tied with our conflict
>with al Qaeda.
>
>
>
>You know, we feel comfortable that this surveillance is consistent with
>requirements of the 4th Amendment. The touchstone of the 4th Amendment
>is reasonableness, and the Supreme Court has long held that there are
>exceptions to the warrant requirement in -- when special needs outside
>the law enforcement arena. And we think that that standard has been met
>here. When you're talking about communications involving al Qaeda, when
>you -- obviously there are significant privacy interests implicated
>here, but we think that those privacy interests have been addressed;
>when you think about the fact that this is an authorization that's
>ongoing, it's not a permanent authorization, it has to be reevaluated
>from time to time. There are additional safeguards that have been in
>place -- that have been imposed out at NSA, and we believe that it is a
>reasonable application of these authorities.
>
>
>
>Q Mr. Attorney General, haven't you stretched --
>
>
>
>Q -- adequate because of technological advances? Wouldn't you do the
>country a better service to address that issue and fix it, instead of
>doing a backdoor approach --
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: This is not a backdoor approach. We believe
>Congress has authorized this kind of surveillance. We have had
>discussions with Congress in the past -- certain members of Congress --
>as to whether or not FISA could be amended to allow us to adequately
>deal with this kind of threat, and we were advised that that would be
>difficult, if not impossible.
>
>
>
>Q If this is not backdoor, is this at least a judgment call? Can you
>see why other people would look at it and say, well, no, we don't see it
>that way?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: I think some of the concern is because
>people had not been briefed; they don't understand the specifics of the
>program, they don't understand the strict safeguards within the program.
>And I haven't had a discussion -- an opportunity to have a discussion
>with them about our legal analysis. So, obviously, we're in that
>process now. Part of the reason for this press brief today is to have
>you help us educate the American people and the American Congress about
>what we're doing and the legal basis for what we're doing.
>
>
>
>Q Al, you talk about the successes and the critical intercepts of the
>program. Have there also been cases in which after listening in or
>intercepting, you realize you had the wrong guy and you listened to what
>you shouldn't have?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN: That's why I mentioned earlier that the program is less
>intrusive. It deals only with international calls. The time period in
>which we would conduct our work is much shorter, in general, overall,
>than it would be under FISA. And one of the true purposes of this is to
>be very agile, as you described.
>
>
>
>If this particular line of logic, this reasoning that took us to this
>place proves to be inaccurate, we move off of it right away.
>
>
>
>Q Are there cases in which --
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN: Yes, of course.
>
>
>
>Q Can you give us some idea of percentage, or how often you get it
>right and how often you get it wrong?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN: No, it would be very -- no, I cannot, without getting
>into the operational details. I'm sorry.
>
>
>
>Q But there are cases where you wind up listening in where you
>realize you shouldn't have?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN: There are cases like we do with regard to the global
>SIGIN system -- you have reasons to go after particular activities,
>particular communications. There's a logic; there is a standard as to
>why you would go after that, not just in a legal sense, which is very
>powerful, but in a practical sense. We can't waste resources on targets
>that simply don't provide valuable information. And when we decide that
>is the case -- and in this program, the standards, in terms of
>re-evaluating whether or not this coverage is worthwhile at all, are
>measured in days and weeks.
>
>
>
>Q Would someone in a case in which you got it wrong have a cause of
>action against the government?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: That is something I'm not going to answer,
>Ken.
>
>
>
>Q I wanted to ask you a question. Do you think the government has
>the right to break the law?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: Absolutely not. I don't believe anyone is
>above the law.
>
>
>
>Q You have stretched this resolution for war into giving you carte
>blanche to do anything you want to do.
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: Well, one might make that same argument in
>connection with detention of American citizens, which is far more
>intrusive than listening into a conversation. There may be some members
>of Congress who might say, we never --
>
>
>
>Q That's your interpretation. That isn't Congress' interpretation.
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: Well, I'm just giving you the analysis --
>
>
>
>Q You're never supposed to spy on Americans.
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: I'm just giving the analysis used by Justice
>O'Connor -- and she said clearly and unmistakenly the Congress
>authorized the President of the United States to detain an American
>citizen, even though the authorization to use force never mentions the
>word "detention" --
>
>
>
>Q -- into wiretapping everybody and listening in on --
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: This is not about wiretapping everyone.
>This is a very concentrated, very limited program focused at gaining
>information about our enemy.
>
>
>
>Q Now that the cat is out of the bag, so to speak, do you expect your
>legal analysis to be tested in the courts?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: I'm not going to, you know, try to guess as
>to what's going to happen about that. We're going to continue to try to
>educate the American people and the American Congress about what we're
>doing and the basis -- why we believe that the President has the
>authority to engage in this kind of conduct.
>
>
>
>Q Because there are some very smart legal minds who clearly think a
>law has been broken here.
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: Well, I think that they may be making or
>offering up those opinions or assumptions based on very limited
>information. They don't have all the information about the program. I
>think they probably don't have the information about our legal analysis.
>
>
>
>Q Judge Gonzales, will you release then, for the reasons you're
>saying now, the declassified versions of the legal rationale for this
>from OLC? And if not, why not? To assure the American public that this
>was done with the legal authority that you state.
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: We're engaged now in a process of educating
>the American people, again, and educating the Congress. We'll make the
>appropriate evaluation at the appropriate time as to whether or not
>additional information needs to be provided to the Congress or the
>American people.
>
>
>
>Q You declassified OLC opinions before, after the torture -- why not
>do that here to show, yes, we went through a process?
>
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: I'm not confirming the existence of opinions
>or the non-existence of opinions. I've offered up today our legal
>analysis of the authorities of this President.
>
>
>
>Q Sir, can you explain, please, the specific inadequacies in FISA
>that have prevented you from sort of going through the normal channels?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN: One, the whole key here is agility. And let me
>re-trace some grounds I tried to suggest earlier. FISA was built for
>persistence. FISA was built for long-term coverage against known agents
>of an enemy power. And the purpose involved in each of those -- in
>those cases was either for a long-term law enforcement purpose or a
>long-term intelligence purpose.
>
>
>
>This program isn't for that. This is to detect and prevent. And here
>the key is not so much persistence as it is agility. It's a quicker
>trigger. It's a subtly softer trigger. And the intrusion into privacy
>-- the intrusion into privacy is significantly less. It's only
>international calls. The period of time in which we do this is, in most
>cases, far less than that which would be gained by getting a court
>order. And our purpose here, our sole purpose is to detect and prevent.
>
>
>
>Again, I make the point, what we are talking about here are
>communications we have every reason to believe are al Qaeda
>communications, one end of which is in the United States. And I don't
>think any of us would want any inefficiencies in our coverage of those
>kinds of communications, above all. And that's what this program allows
>us to do -- it allows us to be as agile as operationally required to
>cover these targets.
>
>
>
>Q But how does FISA --
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN: FISA involves the process -- FISA involves marshaling
>arguments; FISA involves looping paperwork around, even in the case of
>emergency authorizations from the Attorney General. And beyond that,
>it's a little -- it's difficult for me to get into further discussions
>as to why this is more optimized under this process without, frankly,
>revealing too much about what it is we do and why and how we do it.
>
>
>
>Q If FISA didn't work, why didn't you seek a new statute that allowed
>something like this legally?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: That question was asked earlier. We've had
>discussions with members of Congress, certain members of Congress, about
>whether or not we could get an amendment to FISA, and we were advised
>that that was not likely to be -- that was not something we could likely
>get, certainly not without jeopardizing the existence of the program,
>and therefore, killing the program. And that -- and so a decision was
>made that because we felt that the authorities were there, that we
>should continue moving forward with this program.
>
>
>
>Q And who determined that these targets were al Qaeda? Did you
>wiretap them?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN: The judgment is made by the operational work force at
>the National Security Agency using the information available to them at
>the time, and the standard that they apply -- and it's a two-person
>standard that must be signed off by a shift supervisor, and carefully
>recorded as to what created the operational imperative to cover any
>target, but particularly with regard to those inside the United States.
>
>
>
>Q So a shift supervisor is now making decisions that a FISA judge
>would normally make? I just want to make sure I understand. Is that
>what you're saying?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN: What we're trying to do is to use the approach we have
>used globally against al Qaeda, the operational necessity to cover
>targets. And the reason I emphasize that this is done at the
>operational level is to remove any question in your mind that this is in
>any way politically influenced. This is done to chase those who would
>do harm to the United States.
>
>
>
>Q Building on that, during --
>
>
>
>Q Thank you, General. Roughly when did those conversations occur
>with members of Congress?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALEZ: I'm not going to get into the specifics of
>when those conversations occurred, but they have occurred.
>
>
>
>Q May I just ask you if they were recently or if they were when you
>began making these exceptions?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALEZ: They weren't recently.
>
>
>
>MR. McCLELLAN: The President indicated that those -- the weeks after
>September 11th.
>
>
>
>Q What was the date, though, of the first executive order? Can you
>give us that?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN: If I could just, before you ask that question, just add
>-- these actions that I described taking place at the operational level
>-- and I believe that a very important point to be made -- have intense
>oversight by the NSA Inspector General, by the NSA General Counsel, and
>by officials of the Justice Department who routinely look into this
>process and verify that the standards set out by the President are being
>followed.
>
>
>
>Q Can you absolutely assure us that all of the communications
>intercepted --
>
>
>
>Q Have you said that you -- (inaudible) -- anything about this
>program with your international partners -- with the partners probably
>in the territories of which you intercept those communications?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALEZ: I'm not aware of discussions with other
>countries, but that doesn't mean that they haven't occurred. I simply
>have no personal knowledge of that.
>
>
>
>Q Also, is it only al Qaeda, or maybe some other terrorist groups?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALEZ: Again, with respect to what the President
>discussed on Saturday, this program -- it is tied to communications
>where we believe one of the parties is affiliated with al Qaeda or part
>of an organization or group that is supportive of al Qaeda.
>
>
>
>Q Sir, during his confirmation hearings, it came out that
>now-Ambassador Bolton had sought and obtained NSA intercepts of
>conversations between American citizens and others. Who gets the
>information from this program; how do you guarantee that it doesn't get
>too widely spread inside the government, and used for other purposes?
>
>
>
>Q And is it destroyed afterwards?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN: We report this information the way we report any other
>information collected by the National Security Agency. And the phrase
>you're talking about is called minimization of U.S. identities. The
>same minimalizationist standards apply across the board, including for
>this program. To make this very clear -- U.S. identities are minimized
>in all of NSA's activities, unless, of course, the U.S. identity is
>essential to understand the inherent intelligence value of the
>intelligence report. And that's the standard that's used.
>
>
>
>Q General, when you discussed the emergency powers, you said, agility
>is critical here. And in the case of the emergency powers, as I
>understand it, you can go in, do whatever you need to do, and within 72
>hours just report it after the fact. And as you say, these may not even
>last very long at all. What would be the difficulty in setting up a
>paperwork system in which the logs that you say you have the shift
>supervisors record are simply sent to a judge after the fact? If the
>judge says that this is not legitimate, by that time probably your
>intercept is over, wouldn't that be correct?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN: What you're talking about now are efficiencies. What
>you're asking me is, can we do this program as efficiently using the one
>avenue provided to us by the FISA Act, as opposed to the avenue provided
>to us by subsequent legislation and the President's authorization.
>
>
>
>Our operational judgment, given the threat to the nation that the
>difference in the operational efficiencies between those two sets of
>authorities are such that we can provide greater protection for the
>nation operating under this authorization.
>
>
>
>Q But while you're getting an additional efficiency, you're also
>operating outside of an existing law. If the law would allow you to
>stay within the law and be slightly less efficient, would that be --
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALEZ: I guess I disagree with that
>characterization. I think that this electronic surveillance is within
>the law, has been authorized. I mean, that is our position. We're only
>required to achieve a court order through FISA if we don't have
>authorization otherwise by the Congress, and we think that that has
>occurred in this particular case.
>
>
>
>Q Can you just give us one assurance before you go, General?
>
>
>
>ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALEZ: It depends on what it is. (Laughter.)
>
>
>
>Q Can you assure us that all of these intercepts had an international
>component and that at no time were any of the intercepts purely
>domestic?
>
>
>
>GENERAL HAYDEN: The authorization given to NSA by the President
>requires that one end of these communications has to be outside the
>United States. I can assure you, by the physics of the intercept, by
>how we actually conduct our activities, that one end of these
>communications are always outside the United States of America.
>
>
>
> END 9:02 A.M.
>EST
>
> ---
>_______________________________________________
>Politech mailing list
>Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/
>Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/)
>
>----- End forwarded message -----
>--
>Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
>______________________________________________________________
>ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com
>8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
>
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